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Abstract 
The paper studies if temporary jobs in the form of fixed-term replacement con-
tracts reduce the risk of future unemployment among job-seekers. Using exact 
matching on labour market history and personal characteristics we find positive 
effects of the replacement contract on future labour market status. We also find 
that the longer the replacement contract the higher the probability of having an 
open ended contract at the same site 2–2.5 years after the start of the contract. 
No effect of the length is found on unemployment, employment or wages. 
Overall, the results suggest that receiving a fixed term contract reduces the risk 
of future unemployment, and that a longer  contract increases the position 
within the workplace but not on the market in general. 
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1 Introduction 
The last decades have shown a sharp rise in the use of temporary contracts in 
many OECD countries. According to the overview in Booth et al (2002), the 
share of employees on temporary contracts rose in 10 out of 13 surveyed 
OECD countries during the 1990s. Sweden experienced one of the sharpest 
rises as the share of all employees during a year that are on some kind of tem-
porary contract rose from 10.1 to 15.5 % between 1990 and 1998. In 1998, only 
Spain (32.9 %), Finland (17.7 %), and Portugal (17.3 %) had higher shares than 
Sweden. 
The presence of temporary jobs is likely to affect the labour market in a 
number of ways, both from a micro and macro perspective. Most previous mi-
cro oriented studies have focused on the jobs from the employed workers per-
spective, that is, by comparing temporary contract with permanent contract. For 
example, Booth et al (2002) conclude their overview of this literature by stating 
that “… temporary jobs are – from worker’s perspective – bad-jobs…” 
(p F188). 
To complement the picture, this paper focuses on the potential role that 
temporary contracts can play in improving the labour market position of work-
ers lacking regular employment.
 We focus on whether temporary contracts help 
reduce the risk of future unemployment (i e act as “stepping-stones”) or if they 
instead just postpone the unemployment experience (“dead-ends”). Our com-
parison state is thus further job seeking. Previous works in this strain of the lit-
erature include Autor & Houseman (2005), Heinrich et al (2005a, 2005b), and 
Zijl et al (2004), as well as several studies evaluating the impact of subsidized 
temporary employment (e g Gerfin & Lechner, 2002, and Forslund et al, 2004). 
Except for Autor & Houseman (2005) that finds negative effects of temporary 
help jobs in the US, the above studies suggest that temporary employment, and 
subsidized employment that mimics “real” jobs reasonably close, have positive 
effects on the outcomes of the participants. A general concern regarding subsi-
dized employment, however, is crowding out of regular employment. 
A temporary job may improve the labour market status of a previously un-
employed worker through two channels: first, by providing a contact with a 
specific employer (potentially providing access to useful networks and produc-
ing positive ‘signals’) and second, by providing work experience. While the 
first of these effects should be more or less independent of the duration of the 
temporary employment, the second effect grows with the length of the contract. 
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A potential cost of being in a temporary job is that the effort spent searching for 
permanent jobs may be lower during the time spent at the temporary job. Thus, 
the effect of receiving a longer temporary contract may differ from the effect of 
receiving a shorter contract. This paper aims at not only identifying the total ef-
fect of receiving a temporary contract, but also to separately identify the net ef-
fect of contract length. 
Our empirical analysis uses data on workers receiving 3–12 months of tem-
porary, fixed-term, jobs as replacements for participants in a Swedish subsi-
dised career break program. Apart from being an evaluation of the specific pol-
icy, we find it useful to study this particular form of temporary contracts since 
the data include information about the a priori planned duration of the fixed 
term contract. 
The analysis has two parts: first we use exact matching techniques to study 
the effects on future labour market outcome of receiving a replacement con-
tract. Since we have a huge pool of potential comparison individuals, we are 
able to use exact matching on a large number of variables capturing labour 
market history and personal characteristics. The effect is measured 13–24 
months from the start of the contract. The results from this register-data based 
analysis show that replacement contracts do improve the labour market status: 
the probability of being unemployed as well as the probability of being regis-
tered with the Public Employment Service (PES) decrease due to the contract.
1 
An analysis of the effect on different subgroups does not provide any conclu-
sive answer to whether the contracts are more or less beneficial for workers 
with a relatively weak labour market position. 
The second part of the analysis studies the effect of receiving a longer, 
rather than a shorter, replacement contract. The length of the contract is deter-
mined by the person on leave and is, we argue, likely to be exogenous to unob-
served characteristics of the replacement worker. Thus, we believe it is reason-
able to rely on a linear regression model. In the analysis, we compare workers 
receiving temporary contracts with each other. Besides register data we use 
survey information to study effects on the number of hours worked, self re-
ported unemployment, hourly wages and the probability of getting an open-
ended contract. The results of this analysis show no effect whatsoever of the 
contract length on wages, unemployment or hours worked. The zero-effect is 
precisely estimated, suggesting that the insignificant estimate is due to a negli-
                                                      
1 Being registered with PES may imply both unemployment and having another temporary job. 
IFAU – Stepping-stones or dead-ends?  4  
gible actual effect and not due to lack of variation in the contract length. How-
ever, we do find positive effects on the probability of having an open-ended 
contract 2–2.5 years after the start of the contract. Also, we find some indica-
tions of a positive effect on the probability of remaining with the same em-
ployer. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional 
background and the data. Section 3 describes the method of matching and 
shows results from the analysis of the effects of receiving a contract. Section 4 
shows results concerning the effects of contract length. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Background and data 
2.1  Temporary jobs in Sweden
2 
Booth et al (2002) describes the strictness of Swedish employment protection 
as being about average by international standards, both for temporary employ-
ment and for regular employment. The Swedish Employment Protection Act 
stipulates that contracts are open ended by default unless otherwise stated. For 
permanent contracts, there is no redundancy pay, but the notice-periods are 
longer than in most countries. Mass layoffs are accompanied by negotiations 
and a seniority rule is the basic principle. 
Swedish labour market institutions are characterised by high union member-
ship rates and high coverage rates of union contracts. These contracts can, in 
principle, contradict most labour laws in favour of either of the parties. How-
ever, in practice very few collective agreements mitigate the Employment Pro-
tection Act. The act was reformed in 1997, allowing for the use of temporary 
contracts without a specified reason for up to 12 months (under some condi-
tions). At the same time the law instigated a right for local parties to sign 
agreements on fixed term contracts, an option that previously only was avail-
able at higher levels of bargaining. The reformed act also stipulated that a 
worker having more than 3 years of temporary employment within a 5 year pe-
riod should be treated as having an open-ended contract. 
                                                      
2 This section briefly describes the use of temporary contracts in Sweden in recent years. Unless 
stated otherwise, it is entirely based on Holmlund & Storrie (2002). 
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Holmlund & Storrie (2002) discuss the use of temporary employment in 
Sweden in the 1990s in great detail: In 1990 10 % of all Swedish employment 
was in the form of temporary contracts. By 2000, this number had increased to 
15 %. Most of the temporary contracts are held by female workers (18 % com-
pared to 13 % for males). The three industries providing the most temporary 
jobs are “Personal and cultural services”, “Education”, and “Health and care”. 
The most important form of temporary employment in Sweden is fixed-term 
replacement contracts that constituted a stable fraction of around 4–5 % of total 
employment during the entire 1990s. The increased use of temporary contracts 
was thus mainly due to other forms of temporary employment such as on-call 
contracts, project work and probationary employment. The frequent use of re-
placement contracts are probably a function of the long statutory vacation peri-
ods as well as the generous Swedish parental leave schemes that allow for 480 
days of subsidised leave from work after the child is born.
3 
Holmlund & Storrie (2002) also show that the average duration of fixed 
term employment spells declined over the 1990s. They estimate the average 
length of a temporary contract to be three quarters (compared to 40 quarters for 
permanent employment) on average during the 1990s. They also conclude that 
the main reason for the increased use of temporary contracts is due to a 
changed macroeconomic environment (such as higher unemployment rates) 
rather than due to legislative changes. 
In this paper we study temporary jobs generated by a Swedish subsidised 
“career-break” program that ran as a pilot in 12 Swedish municipalities during 
the period February 2002–December 2004. The program is instituted on a per-
manent and national basis from January 2005.
4 The program implies that an 
employee is offered a sabbatical leave for a period of 3–12 months, if an 
unemployed person (registered with the PES as unemployed) acts as a 
substitute. The purpose of the program is twofold: (i) to provide an opportunity 
for an employee to take a career-break for upgrading of skills, recreation, child 
care or whatever the absentee chooses; (ii) to improve an unemployed person’s 
labour market position. Participation in the career-break program is conditional 
on the employers consent; however the unemployed substitute must be hired in 
consultation with the Public employment office. This paper focuses on how the 
                                                      
3 Of these, 60 days are earmarked for each of the parents, thus the longest leave spell for one in-
dividual is 420 days. 
4 The “career break” program is administered by the PES. 
IFAU – Stepping-stones or dead-ends?  6  
replacement workers were affected by the temporary jobs.
 Skans & Lindqvist 
(2005) is an evaluation of how the career breaks affect the workers on leave. In 
short, wages reduce some for all participants, and the probability of retirement 
increases for elderly workers. Sickness absence and working hours are not af-
fected by the career break. 
From Fröberg et al (2003) and Lindqvist (2004) we know that most re-
placement contracts were held by females in the public sector, a feature that is 
shared with temporary employment in general. Besides the unemployed per-
sons recruited as substitutes had in general a better position on the labour mar-
ket in comparison to the average unemployed registered at the PES: the substi-
tutes were younger, less likely to have a work-related disability, they had a 
higher level of education and on average shorter spells of registration with the 
PES (before entering the career-break program). About 50 % of the substitutes 
where picked by the employer among persons who at some point of time had 
been working at the working place where the temporary job was offered (36 % 
did actually work at the working place just when offered the contract). We dis-
cus how this may affect the results in section 3.3. 
The mean length of the leave spell and consequently the spell of the tempo-
rary job for the previously unemployed worker was 10 months and the median 
12 months. Figure 1 shows the distribution of lengths. The advantage of using 
these particular replacement contracts lies in the fact that we are able to observe 
the exact planned lengths of the fixed-term contracts. Our data from the PES 
include information on the replacement workers and all job-seekers in the 12 
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Figure 1 Lengths of the replacement contracts 
Source: PES register data 
IFAU – Stepping-stones or dead-ends?  7  
2.2  The structure of the analysis 
We are interested in whether a temporary employment contract improves the 
future labour market status for the person receiving it. Furthermore, we wish to 
investigate whether workers who get long temporary contracts do better than 
workers who get shorter contracts. We do the analysis in two steps. First, we 
look at the average effect of receiving a temporary contract compared to not re-
ceiving one, on those who receive one. This is the usual “average treatment ef-
fect on the treated” or ATT. We estimate it by matching the replacement work-
ers with a comparison group. Second, we look at the effect of contract length 
by comparing the replacement workers with each other. 
There are several reasons for dividing the analysis in two parts. To identify 
the ATT of the temporary contracts, we need an estimate of the counterfactual 
state of no contract. The register data include detailed background characteris-
tics, which makes it possible to base the analysis on conditional independence 
assumption. Matching is thus an ideal method for estimating the ATT. It allows 
us to identify the effect fully non-parametrically without using comparison ob-
servations outside the common support. This is especially important in our case 
where the group of treated is substantially different from the average registered 
worker; they have a much stronger position (see Larsson & Skans, 2004).
5 
When analysing the effect of contract length, using a comparison group 
seems unnecessary. From the first part of the analysis we know whether the 
contracts on average were beneficial. Besides, we do not observe the contract 
length for the comparisons since they by definition not started as replacements.
6 
It would thus not be possible to match on contract length. Linear regression and 
probit models applied only on the replacement workers also allow us to test for 
various specifications with contract length as continuous and dichotomous 
variable. Moreover, we want to use the survey data that include interesting la-
bour market outcome measures after the end of the contract. The survey data 
are available for workers who had a temporary contract only, and not for the 
comparison group. 
 
                                                      
5 Of course, it is possible to exclude observations outside the common support when using linear 
regression, as well. 
6 Some of the comparisons may of course start on some kind of replacement contract later on. We 
do not want to exclude them from the analysis since that would imply conditioning on future 
events, potentially causing bias in the results. 
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2.3  The outcome of interest 
Our empirical models study the effects on discrete outcomes. To be more spe-
cific, we will look at the time used in unemployment or as registered with PES 
during the second year after the contract start (months 13–24). We count the 
number of days in unemployment, or the number of days of registration, during 
the whole follow-up year, as well as during the quarters of that year.
7 Figure 2 
illustrates. Consequently, the results will report the change of days due to the 
contract: the larger the decrease of days the better the effect of the contract. 
 
Start of the contract 
month 1   13–15   16–18   19–21  22–24 
Time 




Figure 2 Illustration of how future labour market outcome is measured 
 
In the first part of our analysis we are interested in whether time spent in a 
temporary contract was better for the person’s future labour market outcome 
than time spent elsewhere, independent on how long the contract was. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to measure the outcomes relative to the start, rather than the 
end, of the contract. When analysing the contract length, other approaches 
could be considered. However, we still want to consider the alternative time-
use of the replacement workers and thus we follow the workers from point of 
time they start their contract. 
The data generating process and the institutional setting, however, imply 
some restrictions on the outcome of interest. The PES routines make it very dif-
ficult to judge the transitions during the contract since the data do not contain 
any specific category “Career-break replacement”. The replacement workers 
IFAU – Stepping-stones or dead-ends?  9 
                                                      
7 See e g Carling & Larsson (2005) for a similarly structured analysis.  
were instead recorded into various categories, making it impossible to know 
whether transitions during the contract reflect actual changes or just changes in 
the recordings. Consequently, we do not consider what happens during the 12 
first months after the contract start – the maximum duration of a contract.
8 
Second, we need a tool that is not sensitive to small changes in the contract 
length since the contracts were sometimes prolonged when the “regular” 
worker returned to work in order to have a short overlap with both workers. 
Counting the days in unemployment and registration as in Figure 2 works well 
as it incorporates several months after the ex ante contract end. 
Finally, workers on temporary contracts differ from the average unem-
ployed in that they have frequent transitions between employment and unem-
ployment. Thus, the time to the first exit from unemployment is not very in-
formative in the long run; rather we are interested in the incidence of unem-
ployment during a longer period. 
In sum, the timing of recorded transitions is not sufficiently informative to 
use as an outcome measures. Therefore our empirical models study the effects 
on discrete outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 The  register  data 
The register data are collected from the administrative register database at the 
Public Employment Service (PES). The data contain detailed information on 
unemployed individuals’ labour market history such as registration dates, job 
training activities, temporary jobs, and participation in active labour market 
programmes. Employed workers looking for a new job through the PES are 
registered in one of several possible categories; the exact category depends on 
the type of current employment.
9 The database also contains individual charac-
teristics such as gender, age and level of education. Thus, we can for each per-
son observe the number of days in unemployment as well as the number of 
days in any other type of registration category at the PES since August 1991 
until February 2005. 
                                                      
8 The data section will describe the procedure in more detail. Larsson & Skans (2004) analyzed 
what would have happened to the replacement workers during the participation time in the ab-
sence of a replacement contract. The results suggested substantial deadweight losses during the 
duration (in the order of 50 %). 
9 Throughout this paper we disregard one on-the-job search category that mainly applies to work-
ers in long-term contracts. 
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According to the regulations for the “career-break” replacement contracts, 
the replacement workers should be recruited among job seekers registered with 
the PES.
10 Thus, all of the replacement workers should appear in the database 
prior to the contract start. In the PES database, the fixed-term contracts associ-
ated with the career-break program are considered as ordinary employment and 
not as a labour market program. The replacement workers can thus either be re-
corded in one of several different categories for employed people or be deregis-
tered from the PES. The choice between these alternatives is determined by the 
replacement worker in consultation with the PES officer and may change over 
time. This phenomenon creates a problem when identifying start- and stop-
dates. However, the National Labour Market Board administrating the PES has 
documented these specific replacement contracts separately since August 2002, 
and we match this information to our data in order to get the start and end dates 
from then on.
11 
Data coverage ends in February 2005 and since we wish to have a reasona-
bly long follow-up period we restrict the analysis to replacement contracts 
starting up to February 2003. Thus, we study all the replacement contracts 
starting between August 2002 and February 2003, in total this amounts to 1,016 
observations.
12 From this population we drop 115 individuals who were not 
registered immediately before they received the replacement contract because 
they cannot be matched with any of the potential comparison persons who all 
are registered with the PES. After imposing these restrictions the final sample 
consist of 901 replacement workers. 
We use a comparison group selected from all individuals registered with the 
PES in the 12 Swedish municipalities covered by the career-break pilot.
13 
                                                      
 
10 In theory, they should be registered in the category unemployed, however, in practice this has 
not been the case. 
11 In practice, it is the length and timing of the person on leave that is recorded together with a 
link to the replacement worker. 
12 This is the subset for which we know the start and stop dates: In 50 cases there were more than 
one replacement worker for a person on leave, in 8 cases the replacement worker replaced more 
than one person on leave and in 29 cases there were more than one leave-spell for a single per-
son. Since this prevents the start and end dates from being inferred, the replacement workers 
connected to such cases are dropped. In addition, 11 individuals were dropped due to missing 
values in their start dates. 
13 For the comparison group, we apply the same exclusions except for the exclusion of individu-
als who where not registered immediately before they received the replacement contract. Instead, 
we remove all individuals who were not registered at the first of each month. Furthermore, we 
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Every first date in a month (during August 2002–February 2003) we collect all 
individuals who are registered with the PES. That date is then a “fictional” start 
date of that comparison “unit”. All time-varying background and outcome vari-
ables are then determined relative to that date. Naturally, the same individual 
may be collected several times but with different values regarding background 
and outcomes. Thus, our stock of potential comparisons consists of 490,299 
units based on 107,008 individuals. 
 
2.4.2 The  survey  data 
In February 2005 a telephone-administered questionnaire was directed to 942 
of the 1,016 workers receiving a temporary contract during the period August 
2002–March 2003;
14 538 responded the questionnaire, thus the response rate 
was 57 % of 942 (or 53 % of 1,016). The Appendix provides an analysis of re-
sponse rates for different categories of workers. The main reason for non-
responses was failure to contact the respondent, either because of incorrect 
telephone numbers or since the respondent was not accessible during the survey 
period.
15 The non-response group is slightly overrepresented by younger indi-
viduals, males and non-Swedish citizens. This does not however seem to affect 
our results. Besides controlling for age, citizenship and level of education in 
our estimations we are able to use the register data outcome variables to check 
the sensitivity. The effect of the temporary contract based on the register data is 
not significantly different when estimated on the entire (register data) popula-
tion and on the survey respondents. 
The respondents where asked questions regarding their employment, work-
ing hours and wages. See the Appendix for descriptive statistics. The survey 
was linked to the register data from the Händel database. The responses, to-
gether with register information on the respondents’ labour market history is 
used as measures of outcome in section 4 to investigate to what extent contract 
length affects hours worked, wages and the probability of getting a permanent 
contract. 
 
                                                                                                                                 
remove individuals who were registered in search categories that include zero replacement work-
ers. 
14 74 individuals where excluded from the survey sample since they had refused to take part in an 
earlier survey of the career break program conducted by IFAU (see Lindqvist, 2004).  
15 A more detailed description of reasons for non-responses is available upon request. 
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2.5  Further variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
The replacement workers are far from a random sample of PES-registered indi-
viduals. They have less unemployment in their labour market histories and 
have spent more time as not registered. Furthermore, many of the workers have 
a short registration spell just prior to the replacement contract but considerable 
time spent registered in the past, suggesting frequent cycling between employ-
ment and unemployment. 
Due to this phenomenon, we wish to characterize the unemployment histo-
ries of the individuals in a way that includes as rich information as possible on 
the mix of temporary employment, unemployment and time spent as not regis-
tered. We use the term “temporary employment” for individuals that are regis-
tered with the PES as temporary employed (any kind of contract), or are regis-
tered as being part-time unemployed, employed on an hourly basis or similar 
categories. As temporary employment we also include individuals in different 
forms of subsidised employment programs. By unemployed we mean “open 
unemployment” and participation in one of the many forms of training pro-
grams. “Not-registered” means either not registered at the PES, or registered as 
searching “on the job”. 
We divide each individual’s labour market history into three parts: 0–3 
months back, 4–12 months back and 13–48 months back. For each period we 
classify each individual in one of five classes: 
 
i)  Not registered if the sum of unemployment and temporary employ-
ment is less than 10 % of the period. 
ii)  Unemployed  if more than 90  % of the period is spent as unem-
ployed. 
iii)  Temporary employed if more than 90 % of the period is spent in 
temporary employment. 
iv)  Mixed registration if none of the above but the sum of unemploy-
ment and temporary employment is more than 90 % of the period. 
v)  Other if none of the above, i e if the period is spent in a mix be-
tween unemployment, temporary employment and without registra-
tion. 
 
The aim of this procedure is to generate variables that capture the employ-
ment-unemployment cycling of the group of replacement workers we are study-
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ing. We also match on the category the individual is registered within one day 
before the contract start. 
We use some additional information on the labour market history of the in-
dividuals. The first is benefits, where we use three categories; regular unem-
ployment insurance (related to previous income), the Alfa fund (a lower fixed 
amount), and no compensation.
16 We also use an indicator variable for whether 
the person is searching outside of the local labour market. Finally we group the 
registration categories of the individuals (as recorded one day before the fixed 
term contract started) into five groups: openly unemployed, labour market 
training, youth program, subsidized temporary employment, and non-
subsidized temporary employment. 
Table 1 below shows descriptive statistics for the replacement workers and 
the full set of potential comparisons. It should be obvious from the table that 
the sample of replacement workers is far from random. In general they appear 
to have a much stronger position at the labour market than the average unem-
ployed. 
                                                      
16 To be covered by the income-related unemployment insurance, membership of an unemploy-
ment insurance fund is necessary. Those who are not members of an unemployment insurance 
fund, or has not been members long enough can receive a basic allowance from the Alfa unem-
ployment insurance fund. However, the Alfa fund has also members who receive full compensa-
tion. Using information on membership in the different funds as an indicator for the type of com-
pensation thus implies some measurement error. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics for labour market history 
Variable Replacements  All  potential 
comparisons 
Benefits    
Regular UI  0.73  0.72 
Alfa fund  0.08  0.09 
No benefits  0.19  0.21 
LM history: 1–3 months    
Not registered  0.10 0.04 
Unemployed  0.15 0.36 
Temporary employed  0.23 0.29 
Mixed registration  0.11 0.10 
Other  0.41 0.21 
LM history: 4–12 months    
Not registered  0.41 0.19 
Unemployed  0.08 0.16 
Temporary employed  0.08 0.18 
Mixed registration  0.08 0.13 
Other  0.35 0.34 
LM history: 1–4 years    
Not registered  0.36 0.26 
Unemployed  0.00 0.02 
Temporary employed  0.01 0.07 
Mixed registration  0.06 0.13 
Other  0.57 0.52 
Status in the PES register one day before 
contract start    
Openly unemployed  0.43 0.48 
Labour market training  0.02 0.07 
Youth program  0.00 0.01 
Non-subsidised temporary employment  0.52 0.29 
Subsidized temporary employment  0.03 0.15 
Searching interlocally  0.08  0.12 
No of observations (no of individuals)  901 482,705  (104,860) 
Note: Due to the sampling procedure, described in the data section above, each comparison person 
appears in the comparison group on average 4.6 times. 
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In addition to the variables describing the unemployment history we look at 
basic individual characteristics (age, gender, citizenship, education) and use 
three seasonal dummies. These variables are described in Table 2 below. 
 







Age at start date     
Max 24 years  0.25  0.17 
25 – 31 years  0.25  0.21 
32 – 40 years  0.25  0.24 
Min 41 years  0.25  0.38 
    
Male   0.32 0.50 
Citizenship      
Swedish  0.91 0.85 
Nordic  0.02 0.02 
Non-Nordic  0.07 0.13 
Education    
Compulsory or less  0.13 0.27 
High school  0.52 0.47 
University  0.35 0.26 
Season    
August–September 2002  0.44 0.30 
October–December 2002  0.27 0.41 
January–February 2003  0.29 0.28 
No of observations (no of individuals)  901 482,705  (104,860) 
Note: Due to the sampling procedure, described in the data section above, each comparison per-
son appears in the comparison group on average 4.6 times. 
 
We create two outcome variables: days in unemployment and days in regis-
tration. Registration includes days in unemployment and days in any kind of 
temporary employment, both subsidized and non-subsidized. The reason for 
measuring outcome in two ways is that we are interested both in whether the 
fixed term contracts reduce unemployment and whether it facilitates a move 
away from registration altogether. Our underlying assumption is that days spent 
as not registered are better than registration in one of the temporary employ-
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ment categories. Each outcome variable is measured during a 3 months period, 
the first period being 13–15 months after the start of the contract and the last 
being 22–24 months after. 
 
 
3  Do temporary jobs reduce the risk of 
future unemployment? 
3.1 Identification 
We are interested in whether the temporary employment contract improves the 
individual’s future labour market outcome. According to the evaluation termi-
nology, we want to identify and estimate the average effect of treatment on the 
treated (ATT), 
 
(1)  () ( ) ( ), 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 = − = = = − = T Y E T Y E T Y Y E θ  
 
where T = 1 denotes temporary job (treatment) and T = 0 no temporary job (no 
treatment). Y is the outcome of interest, for example subsequent employment. 
The evaluation problem is that we cannot observe the same person in two dif-
ferent states at the same time, and thus the counterfactual  ) 1 (
0 = T Y E  – what 
would have happened to the individual had she not had the temporary employ-
ment contract – is unknown. 
To be able to identify the average treatment effect on the treated, we need a 
valid estimate for the counterfactual outcome. If the data available contains in-
formation on all the factors affecting both the selection into the treatment and 
the outcome variable, we are able to identify the counterfactual outcome. For-
mally this assumption can be stated by conditional independence 
 
(2)  χ ∈ ∀ = x x X T Y ,
0 C , 
 
where   is the symbol of independence and  C χ  denotes the set of covariates 
for which the average treatment effect on the treated is defined. In words, the 
conditional independence assumption (CIA) states that, given all the observable 
characteristics (X), the selection into the treatment are not based on the actual 
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outcomes of the treatment. Moreover, in order for the treatment effect to be 
identified, the probability of treatment must be strictly less than one: 
 
(3)  () ( ) ( ) x X T P x P where x P = = = < 1 , 1.  
 
When these two assumptions
17 are fulfilled the counterfactual outcome, 
( x X T Y E = = , 1
0 ) , can be obtained by simply matching the participants with 
identical (with respect to X) non-participants, and then taking the average of the 
non-participants’ outcomes:  ( ) x X T Y E = = , 0.  
Since the potential comparison group consists of nearly 500,000 observa-
tions, we can implement the matching technique using exact matching. This al-
lows us to interact all the different variables capturing the labour market his-
tory. Our matching procedure results in one-to-many comparisons, so that the 
outcome of each replacement worker is compared to the average of all com-
parison persons that have the same X-values. Formally, the average treatment 















































1 ) T - E - T ( ˆ θ , 
 
where n refers to the number of individuals and the index k refers to the “cell”, 
and the index 1 (0) refer to the treated (comparisons). Indexes i and j are for in-
dividuals and Y denotes the outcome. 
 
3.1.1  Does the conditional independence assumption hold? 
The CIA assumption is an identifying assumption that cannot be tested. How-
ever, the standard result from the evaluation literature starting with Ashenfelter 
(1978) is that the main joint determinants of program participation and out-
                                                      
17 Moreover, to make causal analysis possible, the stable-unit-treatment-value assumption 
(SUTVA) must be satisfied for all individuals in the population. The SUTVA has several conse-
quences, the most important of which in our context is that the potential outcomes for an individ-
ual are independent of the treatment status of other individuals in the population. Thus, cross ef-
fects and general equilibrium effects are excluded. 
18 Borland & Tseng (2004). 
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comes, and thus the factor that are most important to include in the matching 
procedure, is the labour market history of the participants.
19 
To the extent that we can generalise these results to our setting we should be 
able to trust the results. Not only do we have a lot of information on the labour 
market history (see the previous section for details), we are also using a com-
pletely interacted model: Where the more commonly applied propensity score 
matching method balances the distributions of observed characteristics, exact 
matching compares every treated worker to other workers with exactly the 
same observed labour market history. We divide the labour market history of 
each person into three periods, each of which we divide into five groups, result-
ing in 625 possible combinations. We also have three UI-compensation classes, 
five registration categories and a dummy for searching “interlocally”. Given 
that the model is completely interacted, this results in 3,750 possible labour 
market histories. In addition, we also have the human capital variables (72 
combinations) and three seasonal dummies. In total this means that we charac-
terise each replacement worker in one of 810,000 possible cells and compare 
their outcomes to other unemployed within the same cell. Using this strategy 




We use two general outcome measures: number of days as registered with PES 
and number of unemployment days. Recall that being registered with the PES 
may imply that the person is openly unemployed, participating in a labour mar-
ket program, or even in a temporary employment (subsidised or non-
subsidised) and searching for a new job. Here, the outcome variable ‘unem-
ployed’ contains open unemployment and participation in labour market train-
ing. The outcome variable ‘registration’ includes all registration categories.
21 
Table 3 shows the results. 
                                                      
19 Examples of more recent studies that all point to pre-training earnings as one of the most es-
sential factors to be controlled for in a labor market program evaluation are Hotz et al (1999); 
Dehejia & Wahba (1999); Heckman et al (1998); Larsson (2003). See also Forslund at al (2004) 
who show that matching based on labour market  history variables and instrumental variables 
(based on regional budget differences) provide similar results when studying the effects of subsi-
dised employment for long-term unemployed in Sweden. 
20 This sub-sample seems to be quite randomly selected from the full sample of replacement 
workers. More detailed results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
21 The only exception being the “on-the-job search” category that mainly applies to those with 
long term contracts wishing to change jobs. 
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Table 3 The average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
Time since start  Replacements  Comparisons  ATT  ATT (%) 
 Unemployment 
15.8 20.5  -4.65***  -23 
13–15 
   (1.09)   
13.1 18.9  -5.83***  -31  16–18 
   (1.01)   
12.3 18.6  -6.25***  -34  19–21 
   (1.01)   
13.0 19.2  -6.20***  -32  22–24 
   (1.02)   
54.3 77.2  -22.9***  -30 
Sum (13–24) 
   (2.06)   
  Registration 
31.0 40.7  -9.77***  -24  13–15 
   (1.34)   
28.9 37.9  -9.02***  -24  16–18 
   (1.30)   
27.6 37.7  -10.09***  -27  19–21 
   (1.33)   
27.4 38.6  -11.22***  -29  22–24 
   (1.30)   
114.8 154.9  -40.1***  -26 
Sum (13–24) 
   (2.64)   
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Note: Columns (1) and (2) measure the average outcomes for replacements and matched compari-
sons. Comparisons are selected according to exact matching based on the variables displayed in 
Tables 1 and 2. ATT is the difference in outcome, Column (4) is the difference in percent of the 
average comparison outcome. Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated by standard proce-
dures assuming independent observations. ***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5 % level. 
*Significant at 10 % level. 
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Recall that all negative figures in Table 3 refer to reduction in unemploy-
ment (or registration) and thus should be taken as “positive” results for the re-
placement contract. The results show that the average number of days in unem-
ployment is significantly
22 lower among the replacement workers than in the 
matched comparison group throughout the time period. This suggests that a re-
placement contract leads to less unemployment after the contract has ended. 
Furthermore, the effect on average number of unemployed days seems constant 
over the time period of twelve months that we are able to observe. 
When we add all types of registration within the PES into the outcome 
measure, the treatment effect remains qualitatively the same: having a replace-
ment improves the worker’s future labour market situation. Once again the time 
pattern does not suggest that the effect wears off with time (during the follow 
up period). It can be noted that the comparison group does not appear to im-
prove its labour market status during the follow-up window. 
In sum, the overall effect of the temporary contracts as described by Table 3 
is a reduction of 22 (40) days of unemployment (registration) during the year 
following the replacement contract.
23 
 
3.3  Who benefits from temporary contracts? 
We also wish to investigate for whom the contracts work best. Especially we 
are interested in whether previous labour market attachment plays a role for the 
effect. In other words, is the effect stronger or weaker for replacement workers 
who had a relatively strong position on the labour market before they received 
the contract, compared to those with a relatively weak position? This is particu-
larly interesting since Larsson & Skans (2004) showed that the deadweight 
losses during the duration of the replacement contract were substantial for those 
with a stronger labour market position. 
                                                      
22 The standard errors are calculated assuming independent observations in the comparison 
group. 
23 Most of these effects stem from the reduced probability of having any registration or unem-
ployment days: Approximately 63% of the replacement workers compared to 51% of the com-
parison group are not unemployed at all during the follow-up year. For not being registered at all, 
the figures are 48% of the replacement workers and 33% of the comparison persons. 
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Table 4 Heterogeneous ATT effects 




Group  ATT  ATT (%)  ATT  ATT (%) 
Gender: Men  -18.61 -24.1  -40.11  -25.6 
Women  -24.88 -26.9  -40.09  -26.0 
Difference  6.27 2.8  -0.02 0.4 
(se) (4.87)    (5.74)   
Age: Below 32 yrs  -25.24 -39.4  -39.89 -32.0 
32 yrs and over  -20.65 -22.9  -40.30 -21.8 
Difference  -4.59 -16.5 0.41 -10.2 
(se) (4.12)    (5.27)   
Citizenship: Swedish  -22.06 -39.0  -40.85 -26.5 
Non-Nordic  -22.18 -22.3  -15.47  -8.9 
Difference  0.12 -16.7  -25.38***  -17.6 
(se) (5.25)    (6.06)   
Education: Compulsory or less  -32.38  -32.6  -62.50  -32.6 
University  -20.46 -27.7  -41.51 -30.3 
Difference  -11.92 -4.9  -20.99**  -2.3 
(se) (8.09)    (9.90)   
Status before start:  
Unemployed  -37.25 -36.3  -43.69 -28.3 
Non-subsidized work   -9.20 -18.0  -33.88 -23.0 
Difference  -28.05*** -18.3  -9.82**  -5.3 
(se)  (4.08)   (4.83)  
LM history:0– 3 months: 
Not registered  -33.98 -53.7  -34.82 -37.4 
Full registration
a  -15.19 -18.4  -28.84 -15.5 
Difference  -18.79*** -35.3  -5.97  -21.9 
(se) (6.97)    (9.23)   
4 months–4 years
aa: 
Not registered  -28.45  -43.1  -46.30  -37.2 
Full registration
a -16.80  -17.7  -28.02  -13.1 
Difference -11.65**  -25.4  -18.27***  -24.1 
(se) (5.50)    (6.87)   
Note: Standard errors (in parenthesis) are calculated by standard procedures assuming independent 
observations. ***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5 % level. *Significant at 10 % level. 
a 
The category ‘full registration’ includes categories ‘unemployed’, ‘temporary employment’, and 
‘mixed registration’, i e denotes individuals who have been registered with PES at least 90 % of 
the period. 
aa ‘LM history 3 months – 4 years’ combines information from the whole period so that 
the category ‘not registered’ (‘full registration’) includes individuals with no registration (full reg-
istration) during either 3–12 months or 1–4 years prior contract start. 
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Table 4 shows results on unemployment and registration when the sample is 
divided according to several characteristics. It should however be noted that the 
sample is split according to one dimension at a time and that these dimensions 
well may correlate with each other. We report the effects both in absolute terms 
(number of days) and in relative terms (percent). 
We start by analysing heterogeneity according to demographic variables. 
There are no significant overall gender differences throughout the period. 
Somewhat surprisingly, however, we see that the effect is growing over time 
for women, and declining for men (although, the differences are not significant 
in any of the periods). The differences according to age and citizenship are not 
significant, but it should be noted that the sample of non-Swedish citizens is 
very small. 
Turning to indicators of weakness or strength on the labour market, the re-
sults show a mixed picture. When measured in absolute terms, the effects seem 
to be larger for low-educated than for workers with university education, even 
if the difference is only significant when looking at registration. In relative 
terms, however, there is no difference between the educational groups. We also 
find a larger effects for those being unemployed before starting the temporary 
job than for those going from one temporary job to another. These results sug-
gest that the effect is larger for workers with weak labour market status. 
However, looking at the labour market history further back in time we find a 
different pattern: The effects are in this case largest for those without any regis-
tration. Thus, overall we find that the results are mixed and we are not able to 
draw any firm conclusion regarding whether temporary contracts works better 
for those with a strong or a weak labour market history. 
In Table 5 we use our survey data to separate people who have had previous 
contact with the workplace where they got their replacement contract. Re-
placement workers were asked whether they had previously worked for the 
same employer who offered them the replacement contract. Approximately half 
of the workers who responded to the survey answered ‘Yes’ (see the Appen-
dix). The evidence in Table 5 suggests that the effect was much larger for those 
that did not have a previous contact with the employer. Among those with a 
previous contact, the effects were similar and thus independent of whether he 
or she was working there at the time of receiving the replacement contract of-
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fer.
24 Overall, this indicates that part of the overall effects may stem from the 
provision of a contact with a new employer.
25 
 
Table 5 Previous contact with employer, effects 13–24 months after start of  
replacement contract 
  Effects on unemployment  Effects on registration 
Contact (N=260)  -19.31  -22.09 
No contact (N=241)  -28.91  -49.02 
Difference -9.60*  -26.92*** 
(se) (5.45)  (7.25) 
Contact & job (N=163)  -17.64  -23.11 
Contact & no job (N=97)  -22.10  -20.39 
Difference -4.45  2.72 
(se) (7.44)  (10.79) 
Note: Contact means that the worker had been employed at the workplace of the replacement con-
tract (self-reported) at some earlier point in time. Contact & job means that the person worked for 
that employer just before receiving the replacement contract. 
 
 
4  What are the effects of having a 
longer contract? 
Longer contracts are likely to provide more work experience. But they might 
also reduce the intensity at which the workers search for a permanent job. The 
net effect of the length on future labour market outcome is thus a priori un-
known. 
In this section we study how the length of a temporary employment contract 
affects labour market attachment using a number of alternative outcome meas-
ures: first we use outcomes corresponding to the previous section, unemploy-
                                                      
24 It is possible that some of the persons who worked for the employer just before receiving the 
career-break replacement contract would not have registered with the PES had they not been of-
fered that contract. Recall that the rules for the career-break program required registration. To 
check whether this potential endogeneity of registration biases our results we have matched on 
the registration category one week before contract start, instead of the registration category one 
day before. The results are not significantly different. 
25 Support for this hypothesis is found in Johansson & Martinson (2000) that finds positive ef-
fects of a Swedish experiment that enhanced employer contacts among labour market training 
participants. 
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ment or registration with the PES. Second, we use survey information on hours 
of employment and self reported unemployment in the survey week. Third, we 
study the wage effect for those working during the survey week. Fourth, we 
look at the probability of working at the workplace of the replacement contract 
and of having an open-ended contract at the time of the survey. 
The analysis is based on comparisons between workers receiving replace-
ment contracts of various lengths. Thus, denoting the outcome by Y and the 
contract-length by L, we have an empirical model describing the effect of the 
contract-length at t months after the end of the program, conditional on indi-
vidual characteristics X and the starting month of the contract M, as 
 
(5)   it i t i t i t it M L X Y ε δ λ β + + + = , 
 
We use both register and survey data to look at the effects of contract 
length. Data from the PES register – that are the same as in the previous section 
– measure the outcome t months after the start of the contract. The survey was 
conducted in February 2005, thus measuring the outcome approximately 2–2.5 
years after the start of the temporary contract.
26 We include the month dummies 
in order to control for both the season and, when using the survey data, the time 
of the survey date. 
We use regression models to correct for the same covariates as was used in 
the matched analysis in the previous section. We are unable to use matching 
since we no longer have access to the large potential comparison group when 
we compare workers on replacement contracts to each other. The regression 
model is less flexible than the matching model used previously as it is not 
completely interacted as the exact matching model. On the other hand, we are 
less concerned with selection in this part of the analysis since the persons on 
leave (with the consent of the employers) determine the length of the contract. 
Thus, we judge that managing selection into the length of contract requires a 
less elaborated model than selection into a contract at all. The identifying as-
sumption underlying the causal interpretation in this section is that all (poten-
tial) factors affecting both contract length and the outcomes are captured by the 
linear functions of the observed characteristics. 
 
                                                      
26 See the Appendix for a discussion of non-responses and descriptive statistics. 
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4.1  Do longer contracts reduce future unemployment 
more? 
Table 6 shows the effects of contract-lengths on unemployment and registra-
tion. The same outcome measures as when estimating the average treatment ef-
fects on the treated of getting a temporary contract are used in these cases.
27 We 
present models estimated both with and without covariates as a support for our 
notion that contract length is largely uncorrelated with aspects of the replace-
ment worker.
28 In all cases we control for the calendar month that the contract 
started. The table shows few significant effects of the length of the contract. 
The point estimates suggest that a one month longer contract affects unem-
ployment and registration by less than one day during the entire one-year fol-
low-up period. The insignificance of the estimates does thus not appear to be 
due to imprecision, but due to small actual effects. 
Due to the small overall effects we find, studying the time pattern will be 
somewhat speculative. The few (marginally) significant estimates we find sug-
gest that there are positive short run effects on unemployment, but negative 
short run effects on registration. This suggests that workers on shorter contracts 
found other forms of temporary contracts after terminating their replacement 
contracts, thus reducing unemployment but not registration. 
                                                      
27 See section 2.5 for a further description of the outcome measures. 
28 We have also experimented with using the matching techniques provided in the previous sec-
tion to study the length effect (grouping the length variable) and the results presented an identical 
picture. 
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  Effect on unemployment 
With covariates        
Estimate 0.609*  0.535*  0.005  -0.346  0.803 
(se)  (0.351) (0.323) (0.315) (0.324) (1.089) 
R
2  0.108 0.095 0.089 0.109 0.121 
Adj R
2  0.072 0.058 0.052 0.072 0.086 
Without covariates 
Estimate 0.550  0.545*  0.017  -0.389  0.723 
(se)  (0.355) (0.325) (0.316) (0.328) (1.113) 
R
2  0.019 0.016 0.010 0.017 0.014 
Adj R
2  0.010 0.007 0.002 0.009 0.005 
 Effect  on  registration 
With covariates        
Estimate  -0.366 0.091 0.505 0.777 1.008 
(se)  (0.438) (0.429) (0.514) (0.517) (1.737) 
R
2  0.161 0.135 0.120 0.122 0.149 
Adj R
2  0.127 0.100 0.084 0.086 0.114 
Without covariates 
Estimate  -0.312 0.106 0.443 0.741 0.978 
(se)  (0.456) (0.442) (0.524) (0.528) (1.802) 
R
2  0.020 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.016 
Adj R
2  0.011 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.008 
Number of       
observations 
901 901 901 901 901 
Note: Dependent variable is days of unemployment/registration during the follow-up period. Es-
timates are for the effect of having one month longer contract. The models “with covariates” in-
cludes controls for all variables described in Tables 1 and 2. All models include a dummy for the 
start month. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5 % 
level. *Significant at 10 % level. 
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The overall impression from this analysis is perhaps surprising since it suggests 
that the extra work experience received form the longer contract plays little or 
no role for the individuals. It is, however, possible that the outcome measures 
we are using are too crude. Thus, we proceed by studying the effects of contract 
length on wages, self-reported unemployment, and working hours in February 
2005. To this end we use our survey data. In doing so we are restricted to a 
smaller sample of 485 individuals.
29 The respondents were asked to specify the 
number of hours they worked during the previous week.
30 If they worked less 
than 36 hours they were also asked whether they would have preferred to work 
more and if not so, why. Depending on the type of contract, people were asked 
to report their monthly or hourly wages. We convert the responses to monthly 
wages by multiplying hourly wages by 165 and by correcting monthly wages 
for part time work. 
                                                      
29 We have estimated the register-effects (corresponding to Table 6 above) for this sample, and 
all effects are insignificant in this sub-sample as well. 
30 If they could not give a specific number, they were asked to reply within specified intervals (0, 
1-14, 15-24, 25-35, 36+). In the cases were respondents used the intervals we use the most fre-
quent reply within the interval instead (1, 8, 20, 30 and 40). 
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Table 7 Effects on self-reported hours, unemployment and wages 
  Hours of work  Unemployed  ln (Wages) 
With covariates       
Estimate 0.398 -0.005  -0.000 
(se) (0.269)  (0.007)  (0.003) 
R
2 0.141  – 0.384 
Adj R
2 0.076  –  0.322 
Without covariates      
Estimate 0.520*  -0.010  0.003 
(se) (0.267)  (0.007)  (0.004) 
R
2 0.043  – 0.024 
Adj R
2 0.027  –  0.002 
Number of  
observations 
485 485 363 
Model  OLS Probit OLS 
Note: Reported estimates from Probit models are marginal effects. Dependent variables are based 
on survey data from February 2005 (2–2.5 years after the start of the contract). Estimates are for 
the effect of having one month longer contract. The models “with covariates” includes controls for 
all variables described in Tables 1 and 2. All models include a dummy for the start month. Stan-
dard errors are in parenthesis. ***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5 % level. *Significant 
at 10 % level. 
 
Table 7 present the evidence. Point estimates suggest positive effects on 
hours worked during the previous week, but the estimate is insignificant with 
covariates and only significant at the 10 % level without covariates. The point 
estimates are relatively modest, a one month longer contracts providing half an 
hour longer average working hours about 2 years after the start of the contract. 
The estimated effect on self reported unemployment is also close to zero and 
insignificant. The estimated wage effect is not only insignificant, it is equal to 
zero to the third decimal after including the covariates. A 95 % confidence in-
terval would at most allow for half a percent wage difference. 
In Table 8 we proceed by looking at the effects of remaining within the job 
and of having an open ended contract.
31 We find a significant estimate on the 
probability of having an open-ended contract. Increasing the length of the re-
placement contract by one month is estimated to increase the probability of 
                                                      
31 These outcomes are self reported (i e the respondents has been asked whether they still work at 
the same workplace as during their temporary employment). 
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having an open ended contract by 2.5 % (about half of the sample does have an 
open-ended contract in February 2005). In order to understand the process gen-
erating these results we asked the respondents whether they still worked for the 
same employer as they did on the replacement contract; the fraction answering 
‘Yes’ to this question was 57 % (see the Appendix). We estimated the effect of 
contract length on this outcome and the results are presented in the second col-
umn of Table 8. The point estimates suggest that those on longer contracts 
more frequently (1.4 % more) stayed on with the same employer. The estimate 
is however only significant at the 10 % level, and only with the covariates in-
cluded, and should thus be interpreted with caution. When combining the two 
questions we find that the entire increase in probability of having an open-
ended contract is within the same workplace as the replacement contract. There 
is no effect on the probability of having an open ended contract at another 
workplace. 
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tract within same 
job 
Open ended 
contract at  
other job 
With covariates         
Estimate 0.024***  0.014*    0.027***  -0.001 
(se) (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.005) 
Without covariates 
Estimate 0.024***  0.011  0.025***  -0.000 
(se) (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.004) 
Number of    
observations 
485 485  485  485 
Model  Probit Probit  Probit  Probit 
Note: Reported estimates are marginal effects. Dependent variables are based on survey data from 
February 2005 (2–2.5 years after the start of the contract). Estimates are for the effect of having 
one month longer contract. The models “with covariates” includes controls for all variables de-
scribed in Tables 1 and 2. All models include a dummy for the start month. Standard errors are in 
parenthesis. ***Significant at 1 % level. **Significant at 5 % level. *Significant at 10 % level. 
 
 
5  Summary and discussion 
This paper evaluates the effect of temporary, fixed-term, jobs as replacements 
for participants in a Swedish subsidised career-break program. These contracts 
are received mainly by workers with a history of cycling between unemploy-
ment and employment. This implies that, already prior to the contract, the re-
placement workers had a stronger position at the labour market than the aver-
age unemployed. 
We compare the workers on replacement contracts with a matched compari-
son group. We use exact matching on a number of variables capturing labour 
market history and personal characteristics. The causal interpretation of the dif-
ferences in the outcomes between replacement workers and their matched com-
parison group is primarily based on the notion that the labour market history is 
the main joint determinant of receiving the contract and future labour market 
performance. 
Given our identifying assumption, the results clearly show that a replace-
ment contract improves the worker’s future labour market status. Both unem-
ployment and overall registration with the Public Employment Service are sig-
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nificantly lower among the replacement workers. The effects could be consid-
ered large in relative terms (the reduction of unemployment days is in the order 
of 35 %).
32 But counted in number of days the effect is in the order of 20 days 
of unemployment during a year, which perhaps is less impressive. The main is-
sue here is that the comparison group also do fairly well, the reason being that 
workers receiving the replacement contracts are selected among workers with a 
relatively strong position at the labour market. 
We also estimate heterogeneous treatment effects. We find no conclusive 
evidence on whether the effects are larger or smaller for workers with a rela-
tively strong position on the labour market. The effects do however appear 
smaller for those with a previous contact with the employer of the replacement 
contract. 
When separately studying whether a longer contract is better than a shorter 
contract we do not find any significant effects on unemployment or registration 
(at the PES). In this analysis we rely on regression models and the assumption 
that the length of the contract is uncorrelated with unobserved characteristics, a 
notion that gets some indirect support by the fact that the observed characteris-
tics seems to play only a tiny role. 
We also use survey data on self-reported hours of work and unemployment 
verifying that the length of the contract is unimportant for the future employ-
ment prospects. Furthermore, we study the effect on future wages and find no 
significant effect there either. The main reason for the insignificant estimates 
seems to be small actual effects rather than imprecision since all point estimates 
are tiny. 
However, when using the survey data to look at the probability of having a 
regular open-ended contract we find strong positive effects. Furthermore, there 
are indications of an increased probability of staying on with the same em-
ployer. When separately identifying the effect of open-ended contracts with the 
own employer and with other employers we find that the entire effect comes 
from within the workplace of the replacement contract. 
Overall the results show that temporary contracts do serve as stepping-
stones for the unemployed, which is consistent with previous research. The fact 
that longer contracts do not appear to strengthen this effect suggests that it is 
the contact with the employer that is important. This notion is also supported 
                                                      
32 It is e g considerably larger than the corresponding number in Forslund et al (2004) that study 
the effects of subsidised employment in Sweden. 
IFAU – Stepping-stones or dead-ends?  32  
by estimates being relatively larger for those without a previous contact with 
that very employer. The results are also consistent with reduced search effort 
counteracting the effects of tenure and experience when contracts are longer: If 
a longer contract both increases the probability of staying on and reduces the 
time spent on searching for other jobs, we could have a zero net effect on the 
overall labour market outcomes, but a positive effect within the given work-
place, as is suggested by the results. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 shows background variables from the Händel database for all re-
placement workers who received a temporary contract before April 2003 (total 
population) together with the same description for the responses and non-
response of the survey sample. 
The non-response group is in some extent biased towards younger individu-
als, males and non-Swedish citizens. A possible explanation for this might be 
that younger persons to a greater extent exclusively rely on mobile phones.  
 
Table A1 Responses to the survey 






Women  66.0 %  70.1 %  63.3 % 
Age      
Mean age  35 years  35 years  34 years 
Median age   33 years  34 years  32 Years 
<30  39.4 %  35.9 %  43.7 % 
30–49  48.6 %  51.6 %  47.3 % 
>=50  12.0 %  12.5 %  9.1 % 
Education      
Primary (< 10 years)  14.0 %  11.0 %  14.6 % 
Upper secondary  56.1 %  50.8 %  55.3 % 
Post gymnasium  29.9 %  38.1 %  30.2 % 
Citizenship      
Nordic (Non Swedish)  1.7 %  1.3 %  2.7 % 
Non –Nordic  5.5 %  4.7 %  7.8 % 
Work related disability    3.4 %  2.4 %  3.4 % 
Number of observations  2549  538  478 
Response rate    57 %   
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Hours worked last week  24.67  17.98  0  60  485 
Unemployed (self reported)  0.274  --  0  1  485 
Monthly wage  9.814  0.215  8.854  10.915  363 
Open ended contract  0.497  --  0  1  485 
Working at same job  0.573  --  0  1  485 
Previous contact with the employer:           
Worked for the employer some 
time previously*  0.516  --  0  1  535 
Worked for the employer when of-
fered replacement contract*  0.370  --  0  1  535 
Note: *From a survey in the fall of 2003. See Lindqvist (2004) and Skans & Lindqvist (2005) for 
details about the survey questions. Publication series published by the Institute for Labour 
Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU)  –  latest issues 
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